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Cooperative Exchange with Substitutable Ties and 
Its Competitive Outcomes*




With a model of tie substitution, a construct that reflects each actor’s 
evaluation of his or her social relations or networks, this study proposes 
that each actor’s subjective evaluation of objective structural constraints 
may facilitate or delay the realization of structural constraints in general 
and the division of cooperative benefits in particular. It shows the following: 
first, ego with few (perceived) substitutable ties is likely to accept the 
unequal allocation of cooperative benefits; second, symmetry in tie-
substitution at the global network suppresses (aggravates) competition for 
the division of cooperative outcomes when individual tie-substitution is low 
(high).  
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INTRODUCTION
Does inter-firm cooperation, such as joint ventures and long-term 
supply chains, lead to the fair allocation of cooperative outcomes 
among its participants? While the formation of cooperation indicates 
the presence of cooperative outcomes (e.g., Anderson 1990; Gomes-
Casseres 1994; Hennart 1988; Kogut 1988), its formation does 
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not necessarily guarantee that parties to cooperative exchanges 
may benefit in proportion to their contributions or productivities. 
Partners may free-ride on the cooperation of others so that they 
benefit from cooperation more than what they contribute. They may 
also compete for a larger share of cooperative benefits by exerting 
their negotiation power over the other partners (e.g., Castellucci and 
Ertug 2010). The learning race view of the alliance, for example, 
suggests that alliance partners covertly compete to learn from each 
other while devoting minimally required resources to an alliance 
(Hamel 1991; Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad 1989; Khanna, Gulati, and 
Nohria 1998; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter 2000). In this regard, 
inter-firm cooperation is an implicit form of competition where 
each party is motivated to use cooperation as a platform for its own 
interests. 
Although researchers widely acknowledge conflicts of interests 
inherent in interfirm cooperation, the process of dividing cooperative 
benefits receives relatively little attention from the literature with a 
notable exception of network exchange theory (e.g., Willer 1999), a 
series of experimental studies on the effects of network structure 
on the allocation of cooperative outcomes. This stream of research 
presumes that the structural constraint of social relations leaves 
little room for trading parties’ ability to adapt themselves to either 
favorable or unfavorable relational constraints. However, it is likely 
that the effects of structural constraints are asymmetric, i.e., these 
effects vary with how each actor copes with such constraints. Those 
correctly anticipating these structural effects are more likely than 
those unaware of these effects to either capture possible benefits 
or mitigate potential costs. This in turn implies that the realization 
of structural constraints depends on actions made by each actor 
embedded in social relations, a case that is dubbed as the duality of 
structure and agency by Giddens (1979). 
On the basis of the duality of structure, this study modifies 
network exchange theory by employing tie substitution, a construct 
that reflects each actor’s evaluation of his or her social relations 
or networks. In doing so, this study assumes that each actor’s 
evaluation of and response to structural constraints contributes 
to facilitate or delay the realization of structural constraints. With 
this assumption, this study seeks to understand the mechanism 
of how the structure of cooperative networks affects the division 
of cooperative benefits among partners of those relations, i.e., who 
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gets more from a given cooperation. Cooperative networks refer to a 
collection of dyadic cooperative exchanges. Note also that this paper 
is not about competitive behavior outside the domain of cooperation. 
For example, Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001) propose a model 
of competitive dynamics, which is affected by the configuration 
of cooperative exchanges among firms. In contrast, this paper 
provides no prediction as to how cooperation in a certain domain is 
transferred to competition in another domain. Rather, it shows how 
firms compete inside their cooperative networks when dividing the 
benefits resulting from their cooperation.   
THE ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL
The Degree of Tie Substitution
A tie is defined as any kind of interfirm cooperation or cooperative 
exchange, whose purpose is to voluntarily exchange goods or 
services among independent organizations and is organized by 
explicit or implicit contracts to varying degrees. In other words, this 
study understands an exchange based on voluntary contracting 
as a tie between parties to this contracting. Note that an arm’s 
length transaction in the market is also viewed, by this definition, 
as a tie. All economic transactions or exchanges in the market 
can be conceived as ties. This definition of ‘ties’ even includes 
the atomistic price systems, i.e., the market. In this regard, there 
are two governance modes available to a transaction: tie(s) and 
hierarchy. A basic assumption thus here is that all the exchanges 
are accompanied by social relations, i.e., exchange is mirrored by 
relations. Accordingly, this definition of a tie is compatible with 
a theoretical underpinning of neo-institutionalism: a market is 
one instance of institutions sustained and developed by a specific 
cognitive community (e.g., Powell 1991; Zuckerman 1999). 
One may argue that our definition of a tie is too broad so that 
it mistakenly ignores the variation in the type of exchanges or 
relations. In particular, ties including the atomistic price systems, 
i.e., market ties, may differ from those circumventing the systems, 
i.e., nonmarket ties. For example, Baker, Faulkner and Fisher (1998) 
classified alliances, mergers, interlocking directorates, and political 
activities as nonmarket ties, hinting that these ties should differ 
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qualitatively from pure market ties. Their rationale was that these 
nonmarket ties are devices to go around the market activities and 
that these devices are “instances of market failure (p.148).” However, 
for the following reasons, this study does not distinguish between 
market and nonmarket ties. 
First, what is common between market and non-market ties is 
that they are a form of exchange. When it comes to mergers, two 
or more independent parties sell or buy corporate control rights 
through the capital market. Joint venture is also an exchange where 
multiple independent firms buy corporate control rights collectively 
in return for the provision of financial resources. While parties to a 
market tie buy or sell products or services on the product market, 
those to a non-market tie exchange capital on the capital market. 
In this regard, they all are market-based exchanges. Even without 
activating either the product or the capital market, social actors can 
still exchange resources in various forms. Indeed, as anthropologists 
noted (Mauss 1990; Sahlins 1972), exchanges are also present in 
non-economic activities outside the market. The literature on social 
exchange is a case in point (e.g., Homans 1958, 1961).   
Second, from the efficiency perspective, market ties are not 
qualitatively different from non-market ties. In other words, market 
ties are frequently the source of market failure, which means that 
the concept of market failure does not help distinguish between 
market and nonmarket ties. When actors seek to trade public goods, 
the exchange of goods involves externalities, or some actors have 
private information about exchanges and their consequences, (e.g., 
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995: 350-351), thus underlying 
the failure of the market system. Note also that the economic 
literature, esp., in the domain of agency theory, considers M&A a 
device to correct market failure caused by agency problems, not the 
instances of market failure per se.
Third, non-equity alliances are not nonmarket activities. Rather 
they are based on voluntary and explicit contracting, where 
independent parties exchange their investments (Baker, Gibbons, 
and Murphy 2002, 2008). In this regard, Shapiro (1985) suggested 
that R&D alliances — including joint ventures — are a type of 
ex ante licensing, i.e., a market contract. Moreover, the effects of 
alliances on competitive efficiency vary with market structure and 
the content of alliances, meaning that non-equity alliances are not 
distinguishable from market ties with respect to efficiency (Goyal 
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2007; Goyal and Moraga-Conzalez 2001). 
Lastly, the concept of nonmarket ties may subscribe to a 
classical economics’ narrow view of the market, i.e., a vacuum (or 
relational-free) marketplace of perfect competition. The separation 
of nonmarket ties from market ties implicitly suggests that activities 
remote from perfect competition conceived by classical economists 
are abnormal or ‘not rational’, a situation where sociologists 
unwittingly follow what economists ardently support. As long as the 
relevance of sociological approach to the market lies in its criticism 
against economists’ over-reliance upon rationality, the following 
would unearth the unique contribution of sociological approach to 
the market such as Granovetter’s (1985) embeddedness hypothesis: 
the perfectly competitive market is not normal but ready to melt into 
air, i.e., social relations. 
Against this background, this study treats all the exchanges as 
the instances of ties. 
Tie substitution refers to the extent to which ego’s direct ties 
yield identical or comparable economic benefits from the ego’s 
perspective. That is, it is a construct defined at the ego level. Let a 
tie between two firms, i and j, be Xij. Suppose there is another tie, 
Xik, where firm i has a distinct transaction with firm k. Then, ties 
Xij and Xik are said to be substitutable for i if both Xij and Xik are 
available to i and yield comparably good outcomes. The fact that 
ties Xij and Xik are substitutable for i does not necessarily mean that 
these ties are also substitutable for j or k. Since tie substitution is 
judged from ego’s perspective, there is ‘asymmetry’ possible across 
firms with respect to tie substitution. That is, an exchange with firm 
j, which is substitutable for firm i, will be not substitutable for firm j 
if firms j has an unsatisfactory transaction with firm k.
It should be noted that ties differ in quality. For example, 
embedded ties should exhibit structural qualities different from 
those of arm’s length ties. In this study, however, these differences 
are examined with respect to their impacts on tie substitution, 
i.e., differences in social capital perceived by ego. What I do 
emphasize with this approach is that as is the case with Durkheim’s 
suicide, the proposed efficiency of competition (or cooperation) is 
not independent of social relations that actually constitute that 
competition. In other words, competition may not maximize social 
benefits if the competition (or cooperation) undermines the well-
performing functions of social relations embedding actors of limited 
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rationality and, more importantly, diverse values and preferences.
Tie substitution takes the following two distinct forms, depending 
on whether ego considers indirect ties, i.e., ties among her direct 
partners, while computing such economic benefits: structural 
redundancy (or substitution) and nodal substitution. When ego 
assesses resources flowing through direct and indirect ties, the 
potential and actual economic benefits of ego network — i.e., ego’s 
social capital — is reflected into structural redundancy, i.e., the 
comparability of ego’s direct ties with respect to economic benefits 
contingent upon the indirect ties. The social network literature has 
long suggested that the economic values or benefits of ego network 
vary with the structure of ego network, which in turn depends on 
direct and indirect ties (e.g., Ahuja 2000; Coleman 1988; Marsden 
1983). For example, Burt (1992) suggested that two partners 
mutually connected are structurally redundant whenever ego seeks 
to obtain resources or information from these partners. 
In comparison, nodal substitution refers to the economic 
comparability of ego’s direct ties only. Because it ignores the benefits 
from indirect ties, nodal substitution is not sufficiently structural: 
i.e., it may capture partially social capital available to ego. This does 
not mean that nodal substitutions concern only the attributes of 
partners directly connected to ego, such as organizational size and 
Figure 1. Actor Rationality, Structural Redundancy, and Nodal 
Substitution
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the quality of internal resources, attributes that attract attention 
from the strategic management scholars (Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer 
2000; Kougt 1988; Stuart 2000). Rather, both structural and nodal 
substitution delineates resources flowing through social relations, 
thus unveiling the qualities of relationships as well as resources 
held by partners. In other words, nodal substitution weighs the 
qualities of direct ties against those of partners’ resources.   
This study distinguishes between structural and nodal 
substitutions, two forms of tie substitution, in order to consider 
endogenously the ability to compute social capital on the ego’s side, 
i.e., ego’s rationality. The literature on social capital often presumes 
that ego recognizes and leverages social capital present in her social 
relations (e.g., Bae 2010; Burt 1992; Ryall and Sorenson 2007). 
Burt’s (1992) redundant contacts draw on structural substitution, 
which a rational ego constantly monitors. 
A general approach to structural substitution is the following. 
Assume that two partners exchange their resources at a completion 
rate of θ such that θ ∈ [ , ]0 1  and that these resources flow through indirect ties yet decay with the number of actors involved in the 
indirect ties. For ego ‘i’ that has L different partners, structural 
substitution is then defined as the squared sum of each direct tie’s 
structural substitution:
( )∆ ∆ij ij
L
− •∑ 2   …  (1)
where ∆ ij ij ij jk jk jk ijk d c= −∑δ θ δ θ[ , ( , )] , Δij and δij are the net and the 
total values of direct tie to j, cij is the cost of forming a tie between 
i and j, djk is geodesic distance between actors j and k, and j L∈
and k M∈ , which is the set of j ’s direct or indirect partners. The 
higher value of equation (1) indicates that ego has few, structurally 
substitutable ties in her network. 
As Krackhardt (1987) noted, however, ego is neither fully nor 
precisely aware of her social capital: ego is not perfectly rational. 
It is likely that ego may have insufficient information on either 
social relations or resources available from such relations. This 
consideration leads to nodal substitution, whose evaluation does not 
call for perfect rationality on the ego’s side: ego arguably assesses 
her direct ties as long as tie formation is consciously managed. Of 
course, such assessment may not always be perfect, meaning that 
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nodal substitution is a subjective assessment of ego’s social capital, 
whose value the third party may judge in a different way.
The introduction of nodal substitution serves the following 
theoretical purpose: the integration of local action with network 
structure. Although the social network perspective places the effects 
of network structure before the actions of individual actors, it is also 
undeniable that every relation is an outcome — byproduct at least 
— of actions intended by actors and that such intended actions are 
locally effective, i.e., contribute partially to the formation of social 
relations. The concept of nodal substitution is introduced to model 
ego’s understanding of her social world, i.e., relations, which in turn 
constitute her locally effective action. 
The qualifier, ‘locally effective’, merits further discussions. One 
theoretical motivation behind nodal substitution is that ego’s 
subjective evaluation of her relations is not perfect. Accordingly, she 
may materialize potential benefits from her social capital, yet in a 
limited (thus locally effective) way. In other words, she often fails to 
realize what she intends to obtain. Another motivation is that each 
actor’s nodal substitution — albeit locally ineffective — may interact 
with one another to constitute aggregate actions — i.e., social facts 
— in cooperative exchange networks. In other words, the model 
of nodal substitution seeks to examine emergent properties at the 
group level through mutually interacting nodal substitutions held 
by each actor: the question of how subjective evaluations collectively 
constitute the division of cooperative outcomes at the exchange 
network level. To this end, as discussed below, this paper looks 
into one structural condition, i.e., fully overlapping evaluations or 
symmetric nodal substitution. At the same time, our sole focus on 
a single structural condition is the limitation of this paper. As John 
Stuart Mills suggested (Nagel 1950: 221-223), the residues of this 
paper are thus the evidence for structural constraints imposed on 
ego. 
It should be also noted that tie-substitution is not equivalent 
to tie-dissolution (tie longevity). The former concerns a state of 
social capital available to ego, whereas the latter pertains to a 
state of social relations embedding ego. As is the case with product 
substitution in economics, the concept of substitution only states 
that ego’s direct ties yield comparable benefits, not that ego is willing 
to terminate one of her direct ties.
In contrast, tie dissolution is a state of social relations between 
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ego and her partners. Moreover, the nature of tie-dissolution is 
still open to debates. Economic approach for example emphasizes 
that interfirm relations, especially horizontal cooperation, are not 
long-lasting (e.g., Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell 2000; Kogut 
1989; Park and Russo 1996; Reuer and Zollo 2005). By contrast, 
an institutional approach suggests that relations are difficult to 
modify and serve as structural constraints on actors’ decisions and 
behaviors (e.g., Baker et al. 1998). Network inertia model (Kim et 
al. 2006) represents this approach, which makes a sharp contrast 
to Greve et al. (2010). Accordingly, it is not certain whether tie 
dissolution reveals the presence or absence of social capital among 
partners, i.e., whether partners of dissolute ties find alternative ties 
that can substitute for a current tie, for a tie can be dissolved either 
because participants in a tie successfully complete an intended 
exchange or because they are dissatisfied with the process or 
outcomes of an exchange. 
Antecedents to Substitutable Ties
Why are some ties substitutable and others not substitutable? 
Three different antecedents to tie-substitution are derived from 
the literature on interfirm exchanges such as the structural hole 
theory (Burt 1992), the network closure theory (Coleman 1988), and 
transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985). 
As long as the actor maximizes the novelty of information obtained 
from others, redundant ties are substitutable because they provide 
similar information. Burt (1992) suggests that redundant ties 
provide similar information because of homophily effects (Lazarsfeld 
and Merton 1954; Lawler and Yoon 1998). Homophily effects occur 
if partners get to know one another because their ex-ante attitudes 
or their task-related knowledge is similar. Furthermore, if frequent 
interaction serves as a conduit for homophily, partners become more 
homogeneous after interacting with each other. Hence, whether 
redundant ties are an outcome of ex ante similarity in information 
or a driver for ex post similarity in information, they become 
substitutable from ego’s perspective.
A competing model for inter-firm exchanges, the network closure 
theory (Coleman, 1988) posits that a densely connected network 
leads to a rich flow of information and the emergence of social 
norm constraining opportunistic behavior, and is thus more 
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favorable to actors. This densely connected network is also known 
as embedded ties, a reservoir of social capital with reciprocal 
transaction and enforceable trust (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; 
Granovetter 1985; DiMaggio and Louch 1998). From the perspective 
of information benefits, embedded ties are less substitutable than 
arm’s length ties. 
First, they provide rich information (Bae and Koo 2008; Hansen 
1999; Saxenian 1996). Embedded ties set the ground for shared 
value and reciprocity between partners (Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993), which in turn gives each partner a strong incentive to 
make additional investments in a bid to optimize the exchange 
of information between partners. These investments include the 
development of routines dedicated to a given exchange and the 
access to each other’s IT system relevant to the exchange. Toyota’s 
Just-In-Time production system is a case in point. Second, they 
provide reliable information. People are more likely to disclose 
sensitive and intimate information to their close friends. Information 
obtained from embedded ties is more trustworthy and rich in its 
content, compared with arm’s length ties, whose contacts are 
strangers at best. Taken together, the quality of information varies 
with the trustworthiness of the source as well as its content. This in 
turn suggests that embedded ties are less substitutable than arm’s 
length ties.
Of course, embedded ties are not without costs. The opportunity 
cost of embedded ties is to sacrifice the diversity of information. 
For example, Uzzi (1996) shows that firms with heavy dependence 
on embedded ties tend to perform poorly, compared with those 
having a mix of embedded ties and arm’s length ties. Nonetheless, 
Gulati (1995) demonstrates that firms tend to enter alliances with 
specific partners repeatedly, indicating that embedded ties persist 
over time. This persistence of embedded ties however implies that 
there must be other compensating benefits from embedded ties 
that alleviate the opportunity cost of information diversity. Social 
exchange theory, which originates from operant psychology (Homans 
1961), suggests that such compensating benefits may include 
an obligation, which results from prior favorable exchanges and 
anticipates future profitable exchanges: reciprocity (Blau 1964; 
Emerson 1976). In other words, embedded ties will be repeated 
because the current exchange not only provides valuable outcomes 
per se, but also anticipates valuable future exchanges or discharges 
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social obligations from valuable past exchanges. As a result, 
embedded ties become less substitutable.          
Finally, an efficiency-driven approach, transaction cost economics 
(TCE) deals mainly with the formation of a firm, and not about 
the formation of a tie (Williamson 1975, 1985). Williamson (1985), 
however, attempts to embrace a range of governance modes, 
including relational contracts (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002), 
by reducing the issues of transaction costs to those of contractual 
practices. According to Williamson (1985: 41), “any problem that 
can be posed … as a contracting problem is usefully investigated in 
transaction cost economizing terms.” This means that in a network 
term, TCE deals with the ways to govern or organize transactions 
or exchanges, which are “ties” in this study. Ties occur through 
either of two governance modes, market governance and bilateral 
governance. Market governance is another name for the price 
mechanism and bilateral governance is synonymous with hybrid 
transactions such as franchising and alliances. 
Ties under bilateral governance become less substitutable. 
Transactions for bilateral governance recur among a limited number 
of partners and are supported by transaction specific investments, a 
tendency that values the continuity of a pre-existing trading relation 
(Williamson 1985: 75). Due to transaction specific investments made 
by both parties, few alternative transactions of comparable value are 
available other than current exchanges, which will increase ex post 
transaction costs such as haggling costs. Hence, keeping hybrid 
transactions inside, i.e., crafting hierarchy, is preferred to forfeiting 
them, i.e., using the market. Because of this tendency, bilateral 
governance often transforms into unilateral governance, i.e., the 
hierarchy (Williamson 1985: 115). This lack of alternatives on the 
market suggests that hybrid ties are less substitutable. 
As is the case with reciprocity mentioned above, hybrid ties 
rely on credible commitments, which are irreversible, specialized 
investments to safeguard trading relations. For example, each 
partner to an exchange may make capital investments intended only 
for her trading partners and whose redeployment is not possible 
without incurring significant costs. In this case, fundamental 
transformation eventually follows, where ex ante competition is 
larger than ex post competition and one of the trading parties 
has monopoly power over the other. To avoid ex post rent-seeking 
behavior or opportunism by the others, each party in exchange 
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may voluntarily choose to collectively increase transaction-specific 
investments. Such a reciprocal exposure of specialized assets, i.e., 
bilateral commitments, is rationally designed to reduce the hazards 
of opportunism, which leads their trading relations to be less 
substitutable ties over time. 
In summary, three antecedents to tie substitution are homophily 
effects, reciprocity, and bilateral commitments. That is, homophily 
effects induce redundant ties to be more substitutable, reciprocity 
renders embedded ties to be less substitutable, and bilateral 
commitments makes hybrid ties less substitutable. It should be 
noted that both homophily and reciprocity may lead to conflicting 
predictions on a given tie with respect to tie substitution. For 
example, a redundant tie is ready to be substituted in terms of the 
structural hole theory. In contrast, it could be less substitutable in 
terms of the network closure theory. However, a direct comparison 
is infeasible because redundant ties concern the diversity of 
information, whereas embedded ties focus on the richness of 
information or information loss. 
Nonetheless, these three antecedents should be jointly compared 
to assess tie substitution — especially, the quality of ties — for the 
following reasons. 
First, the qualitative difference between ties is jointly determined 
by three independent antecedents, i.e., homophily, reciprocity, and 
bilateral commitments. Each antecedent alone accounts partially for 
tie substitution. It is possible that non-redundant ties are based on 
a strong social norm and reciprocity. CEOs of a company may have 
embedded ties with their managers of different departments, each 
of whom is disconnected. As Burt (1992) observes, the strength of 
a tie, which addresses one qualitative aspect of cohesive ties, may 
or may not be related to a structural hole. These antecedents are 
independent of one another.
Second, the relative contribution of each antecedent will vary 
across the nature of exchange. For example, brokerage positions 
such as structural holes are more likely to come into play when 
exchange partners are equally attractive and the multiple choices 
or memberships are available to the focal firm, i.e., broker. If one 
exchange party offers by far better terms of trade than the others, 
the choice of non-redundant ties become trivial because a focal firm 
has a single best solution to the design of its exchange networks. 
Third, the relative contribution of each antecedent will vary across 
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firms. Firms differ in the number of alternative ties available to 
them. A central actor, by definition, is one with many alternative 
ties. In particular, a central actor with structural holes is able to 
increase its negotiation power since partners in alternative ties 
are not involved with one another and a central actor is the only 
exchange partner available to them. Since these partners occupy 
disadvantage positions, i.e., peripheral positions in exchange 
networks, it is likely that a central actor wants its partners more 
dependent on current relationships, yet peripheral actors attempt 
to avoid too much dependence on current relationships. On the one 
hand, tie substitution for a central actor depends on how successful 
the central actor induces its peripheral actors to form cohesive ties 
with her. Hence, reciprocity will become critical. On the other hand, 
tie substitution for peripheral actors depends on how they obtain 
bilateral commitments from a central actor and reduce anticipated 
transaction costs.
P1: The degree of tie substitution varies with three antecedents, 
homophily, reciprocity, and bilateral commitments. a) It is an 
increasing function of homophily. b) It is a decreasing function of 
reciprocity and bilateral commitments.
Exclusion as a Mechanism
How does tie-substitution — ego’s evaluation of her direct ties — 
relate to the division of cooperative outcomes? This paper draws 
on network exchange theory and proceeds with the following two 
related assumptions. First, competition for a cooperative exchange 
increases with the likelihood of exclusion from proposed exchanges. 
Second, competition for exchange accompanies competition for the 
division of cooperative outcomes. Third, the likelihood of exclusion 
from exchanges increases with ego’s tie-substitution. In what 
follows, I will examine each assumption.  
Cooperative exchange involves a process of competition where 
parties to an exchange compete to obtain better terms of trade, 
while realizing more gains in return for goods and services. Such 
competition is also reflected into each party’s way of ‘securing 
productive relationships’ (Burt 1992: 4), i.e., how to select and 
complete more profitable transactions with other firms while sifting 
out and terminating less profitable transactions. If all the parties to 
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an exchange are guaranteed to enjoy fair gains from the exchange, 
they may have no incentive to vie for the division of cooperative 
outcomes. Whenever their fair gains from cooperative exchange are 
threatened, competition among partners will ensue.  
Experimental studies on network exchange theory (Patton and 
Willer 1990; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988; Willer 1999) offer 
a general model for competition inside cooperative exchange by 
employing the notion of exclusion. If there are N possible exchanges 
available and M firms competing for the exchanges such that M is 
larger than N, then there are always M − N firms which fail to win 
any exchange. As M increases, M − N increases as well. These M − N 
firms are the ones that are ‘excluded’ from economic exchanges that 
occur. This discussion also suggests that a firm more susceptible to 
exclusion threat will have relatively less negotiation power than does 
its otherwise identical counterpart. 
This model is well compatible with the density-based view of 
competition. For example, economic literature traditionally assumes 
that competition to acquire better gains in exchange increases with 
the number of ‘similar’ firms in the market. Population ecologists 
also model the intensity of competition as an increasing function 
of the density of a population, which is the number of firms 
with a similar structure (Hannan and Carroll 1992). The implicit 
mechanism behind these approaches is that, for a given cooperative 
exchange, the likelihood of one firm winning this exchange will 
decrease if the number of its competitors gets larger. However, 
competition under network exchange theory differs substantially 
from a density-based view of competition: 
Competition by network exchange theory is constrained by 
each firm’s exchange network. In contrast, a density-based 
competition presumes that firms in the same niche face the same 
environmental pressure or constraints. Suppose a producer, which 
relies on outsourcing the key components of its product, each of 
which is produced by a single vendor. The failure to buy any of 
the components will prevent this producer from making its final 
products. The number of trading parties needed for the focal firm is 
then equal to the number of key components needed. In this regard, 
network exchange theory concerns the design of all the exchanges 
needed for the focal firm to achieve its economic interests. 
Regarding the division of cooperative outcomes, network exchange 
theory concerns a focal firm’s ability to exclude trading partners 
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from a given cooperative exchange. The basic assumption behind 
this approach is that ego or the focal firm’s share of cooperative 
outcomes increases with her ability to exclude partners from a given 
exchange. The reason is that those facing the threat of exclusion 
may offer a better terms of trade to ego so that they secure 
cooperative exchanges with ego. From ego’s perspective, this means 
that as her likelihood of exchange exclusion increases, ego may 
compete for a cooperative exchange by conceding competitively her 
share of cooperative outcomes to potential partners. 
This study further extends the above implications of network 
exchange theory by introducing tie-substitution. In particular, 
this study suggests that the likelihood of exclusion varies with 
the number of trading partners with comparable quality, i.e., 
substitutable ties, as well as the number of minimally required 
partners for this exchange. Indeed, Hirschman (1970) shows 
that actors in the market have two options to express their 
dissatisfaction with a currently deteriorating service: voice and 
exit. The exit option, which is widely discussed in economic 
literature, includes dissolution of ties, divestiture, and switching 
into alternative services. In contrast, the voice option refers to non-
market procedure such as making complaints directly to a producer. 
In discussing the relative effectiveness of these options, he argues 
that the voice option will work better if the exit option is used as a 
credible threat. Put it differently, one’s negotiation power over the 
allocation of cooperative benefits will increase if he or she maintains 
more substitutable ties to switch into.
With regard to negotiation power, the prior literature on a network 
structure assumes that a central actor or broker is in a better 
position to maximize its negotiation power thanks to its network 
position (Friedkin and Johnsen 1997; Ibarra and Andrews 1993; 
Burt 1992). Yet, the model developed here suggests that even 
a central actor may lose its negotiation power if its ties are less 
substitutable. For example, Willer (1999) clearly shows that the 
mechanism of exclusion may undermine the dominant position of 
a central actor if the minimally required number of partners for a 
central actor is equal to the number of its current partners. In this 
case, there are no substitutable ties left for the central actor. As 
a result, it is vital to examine tie-substitution before making any 
prediction about the negotiation power of an actor in a network. 
The following case illustrates the role of tie-substitution. Suppose 
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that each firm in the market is allowed to conduct only one exchange 
within a certain period. A focal firm with many substitutable ties 
can choose any of them and exclude the rest without loss of gains. 
If trading partners in these substitutable ties do not have additional 
exchanges other than one with the focal firm, they will compete 
with one another by offering better terms of trade to the focal firm 
to the extent that they successfully complete an exchange. Hence, 
the focal firm with multiple substitutable ties will benefit more from 
competition among its partners that have no substitutable ties.
Actor Rationality and Nodal Substitution
The extension of network exchange theory by tie-substitution 
however poses an important theoretical question of whether network 
exchange theory is compatible with the model of tie-substitution. 
The reason is that network exchange theory draws on structuralism, 
which does not allow for any level of actor rationality, i.e., social 
structure always comes before agency. In contrast, the model of tie-
substitution presumes that each actor seeks to evaluate his or her 
social relations and manage them accordingly. Given that every 
relation is an outcome — byproduct at least — of actions by actors, 
the better understanding of structural effects calls for the analysis 
of how structurally constrained actions contribute to reproducing 
or modifying structural constraints. In this regard, the structuralist 
account of network exchange theory is compatible with that of tie-
substitution once the concept of nodal substitution, not structural 
substitution, is introduced to model ego’s understanding of her 
social world, i.e., relations.
Against this background, this study re-interprets the structural 
implications of network exchange theory from ego’s perspective. 
With nodal substitution, the likelihood of exclusion is recast as ego’s 
subjective likelihood of exclusion. This means that different actors 
may expect different likelihoods of exclusion for the same structure 
of social relations. In the similar vein, competition for exchange is 
viewed as ego’s willingness to compete for a better term of trade. 
Competition appears to be intense when ego feels little negotiation 
power over her potential and current partners because her rivals vie 
for offering a better term of trade to her partners. Ego’s subjective 
evaluation of competitive intensity and thus her negotiation 
power should affect ego’s actual decision for the term of trade. In 
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particular, as ego seeks to make a tie to her partner, ego lack of 
perceived negotiation power will make ego voluntarily concede her 
term of trade with the partner, eventually undermining her share of 
cooperative outcomes in the course of negotiation. Given that nodal 
substitution is ego’s subjective evaluation of relations, one may 
question why ego does not try to keep her interest in the exchange 
that she values highly. The above discussion does not imply that ego 
gives up maximizing her interest. Rather, it simply shows that one 
who loves more will lose more.   
This discussion leads to the following conclusions. First, as 
is shown in network exchange theory, ego has more negotiation 
power over her partners when her ties to these partners are nodal-
substitutable. Second, ego expects that their partners have little 
power to exclude ego from their exchanges as her ties to them are 
nodal-substitutable. In short, the following propositions will hold.
P2: Ego’s subjective likelihood of exclusion decreases with ego’s 
nodal substitution.
P3: Ego’s share of cooperative outcomes increases with ego’s 
nodal substitution.
The above discussion has so far assumed that ego’s decision 
depends on ego’s subjective evaluation of her social relations and 
that neither partners’ evaluation of her relations nor their evaluation 
of ego’s evaluation affects ego’s decision. Once partners’ evaluations 
are brought in, the current discussion calls for the dyadic or 
network level analysis, which is made in the subsequent sections. 
This study however precludes the following two possibilities: 
common knowledge and illusory knowledge. Common knowledge 
refers to a case in which everybody knows what everybody else 
knows. This case however allows for too much rationality to actors, 
which is incompatible with the model of nodal substitution. The 
latter indicates that what each actor knows has nothing to do with 
the reality or actual economic gains. This case is again too restrictive 
because it does not leave any room for actor rationality. The realistic 
and thus representative description of actual decision-making 
should fall between these two extreme possibilities. With limited 
rationality by nodal substitution, this study thus assumes that each 
actor’s evaluation of her social relations is private information in the 
course of negotiation with other partners. 
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Correlated Evaluations and Symmetric Substitution
Cooperative exchange networks involve multiple actors with their 
own interests to satisfy. A structuralist account of these networks 
is typically that the structural constraints of these networks are 
‘foreign’ to each actor embedded into them, i.e., they are social facts 
in a Durkheim’s sense (Durkheim 1952: 318). However, this study 
acknowledges that these structural constraints cannot be perfect 
and that they take their effects through actions by each actor. This 
structuration approach (Giddens 1979) to social networks makes 
the room for nodal substitution. 
This introduction of nodal substitution necessitates the following 
analysis of structuration: how each actor’s nodal substitution 
interacts with one another to constitute aggregate actions — i.e., 
social facts — in cooperative exchange networks? Given that nodal 
substitution is ego’s subjective evaluation of her social relations, 
this study rephrases such analysis as the question of how subjective 
evaluations collectively constitute the division of cooperative 
outcomes at the exchange network level. Nodal substitution ranges 
Figure 2. Substitutable Ties and Cooperative Outcomes
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theoretically from no overlapping evaluations to fully overlapping 
evaluations (i.e., symmetric nodal substitution). Out of these two 
theoretical bounds at hand, this study looks into the case of fully 
overlapping evaluations because the other bound includes a variety 
of cases that cannot be summarized in one way or another. In sum, 
the above discussion is summarized in figure 2.
Note that overlapping evaluations differ from overlapping 
relations. Each actor may have different social relations even when 
each actor’s evaluation of social relations overlaps fully with the 
others’. Overlapping evaluations hence only suggest that actors have 
correlated or identical evaluations of structural constraints imposed 
on them. For example, correlated evaluations refer to what actors 
believe, such as their partners’ power over cooperative networks. 
Such correlated evaluations again vary between the following two 
forms: every actor in a network feels that her direct ties are fully 
substitutable or every actor in a network feels that the direct ties are 
not substitutable at all.
Because the subjective likelihood of exclusion depends on nodal 
substitution, correlated evaluations over social relations will 
lead each actor’s exclusion likelihood to converge. This in turn 
affects actors’ willingness to compete for a better term of trade. In 
particular, the following results are expected at the network level. 
When nodal substitution by each actor is low, symmetric nodal 
substitution suppresses competition for the division of cooperative 
outcomes: actors’ perceived negotiation powers over their partners 
are low so that their subjective exclusion likelihoods are high. 
Accordingly, none of them vie for a more share of cooperative 
outcomes. The lack of competition culminates in the equal division 
of cooperative outcomes at the network level.
 
P4: The division of cooperative outcomes among network 
members is symmetric (i.e., equal) when each member’s nodal 
substitution is symmetric and low.
In contrast, when nodal substitution by each actor is high, 
symmetric nodal substitution aggravates competition for the division 
of cooperative outcomes. When two parties all believe that they have 
more negotiation powers over the other, competition continues until 
either of them runs out of resources and subscribe to the term of 
trade offered by the other. That is, when all the parties are confident 
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about winning the negotiation, only resource constraints faced by 
each party will drive the evolution of competition. Accordingly, those 
with relatively large amount of resources will claim for a larger share 
of cooperative outcomes. 
P5: The division of cooperative outcomes among network 
members is in proportion to the relative difference in resource 
endowments by network members when each member’s nodal 
substitution is symmetric and high.
Do the above propositions imply that the division of cooperative 
outcomes is in equilibrium? In the short run, the division should 
be stable, yet it may not remain so when the objective social 
relations differ substantially from actors’ subjective evaluation of 
the relations. Whether the objective social structure eventually 
overshadows the effects of nodal substitution is a new research 
question, which is beyond the scope of the current inquiry. Network 
inertia model (Kim, Oh, and Swaminathan 2006) however implies 
that subjective evaluations may not diverge from persistent social 
relations. That is, ego with incorrect nodal substitution may either 
undervalue or overvalue the constraints and supports from her 
social relations, but she may adjust her evaluation in the long 
run when she receives consistent feedbacks from persistent social 
Figure 3. Nodal Substitution and Effects across Levels
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relations. The above-discussion is summarized in figure 3.
Horizontal and Vertical Cooperation with Tie-Substitution 
As mentioned above, exclusion likelihood with both nodal 
substitution and the number of minimally required partners for this 
exchange. The latter captures the nature of cooperative exchange, 
i.e., what to complete through a given exchange. While the nature 
of an exchange could be diverse, a frequent and important way of 
classifying exchanges is whether they involve horizontal cooperation, 
i.e., exchange among direct rivals, or vertical cooperation, i.e., 
exchange among different value chain participants. 
Other things being equal, nodal substitution is likely to be high 
for ego’s horizontal cooperation than vertical cooperation. First 
of all, empirical findings on the duration of cooperation, which is 
partly related to the quality of relations, suggest that horizontal 
cooperation would be less durable and thus less valuable to 
ego, compared with vertical cooperation. Alliances among direct 
competitors are found to last for a short period (Kogut 1989; 
Park and Russo 1996; Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell 2000), 
yet supplier-buyer relationships tend to be stable over time (Dyer 
1996). Second, vertical cooperation is more likely than horizontal 
relationships to make transaction-specific investments (Freeland 
2000; Teece 1986; Monteverde and Teece 1982). Few firms make 
every component required for their final products since fast 
technological advancements prevent them from being efficient and 
advanced in every phase of their value chains. Hence, downstream 
manufacturers choose quality suppliers, which are willing to invest 
in transaction-specific equipment, and rely on them for a variety of 
components. The automobile and telecommunications industries 
all illustrate this case. Finally, partners in horizontal cooperation 
are more likely to possess similar resources since they compete for 
the same niche in economic and social environments (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977). Such resource similarity indicates that partners are 
comparable in quality and likely to be substitutable. 
P6: From ego’s perspective, vertical cooperation is less nodal-
substitutable than horizontal cooperation. 
Vertical cooperation emerges out of the division of labor in 
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the value chains. The finished good producer for example is one 
that relies on multiple suppliers for its final product. If one of its 
suppliers fails to deliver key components for its final product, this 
firm, too, cannot run its production process. Therefore, this firm 
is widely open to the unexpected performance of its suppliers 
if it cannot find alternative suppliers of a comparable quality. 
The reverse is true to the upstream suppliers. This explains why 
transaction cost economics (Williamson 1975, 1985) predicts the 
integration of upstream suppliers by downstream producers. 
Accordingly, exclusion likelihood in vertical cooperation is more 
critical to ego’s performance than in horizontal cooperation. In other 
words, the effects of nodal substitution should be more salient for 
vertical cooperation than horizontal cooperation. 
P7: Compared with horizontal cooperative outcomes, the 
reduction in ego’s share of vertical cooperative outcomes is larger 
as ego’s nodal substitution decreases.
Substitution with or without Potential Partners 
The concept of nodal substitution draws on limited actor 
rationality; i.e., actors consider their direct partners only when 
evaluating their cooperative networks. This assumed rationality 
becomes subtle when one needs to judge whether ego compares her 
direct partners with potential ones, a case that is likely to occur in 
reality. Romo and Schwartz (1993) illustrate the role of potential 
partners on nodal substitution. They show that for large, central 
firms the potential partners are readily available so that they 
relatively easily migrate to other manufacturing districts. But many 
smaller suppliers that lack in potential partners face all the costs of 
tie dissolution. This implies that the availability of potential partners 
should influence ego’s nodal substitution. 
Two main sources of potential partners are those exclusively 
trading with each other, i.e., clique members, and those never 
trading at all, i.e., isolates (Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991; Rosenkopf 
and Tushman 1998). Cliques in a network are by definition cohesive 
inside and not accessible to ego outside the cliques. In comparison, 
isolates are easily accessible to ego. As long as nodal substitution 
increases with the availability of potential partners, it follows that:
Cooperative Exchange with Substitutable Ties and Its Competitive Outcomes 83
P8: Ego’s nodal substitution increases with isolates in a 
network, yet decreases with the number of cliques in a network.    
The analysis of potential partners raises the following question: 
does the effect of dyadic tie-substitution (i.e., with a specific partner) 
depend on nodal substitution at the ego network level (i.e., with 
other partners)? In other words, does ego enjoy more benefits by 
cooperating with a partner when her exchange with the partner is 
not substitutable yet her nodal substitution at the ego level is high? 
To address this question, it is necessary to re-examine the definition 
of nodal substitution. As noted above, nodal substitution is ego’s 
evaluation of her social relations, i.e., cooperative exchanges with 
her partners. This means that nodal substitution is not defined 
when ego has only one cooperative partner. For ego with more than 
one partner, nodal substitution is based on pair-wise comparison 
of dyadic exchanges. Equation 1 on page 8 illustrates this logic 
although the term for indirect ties should be dropped when 
computing nodal substitution. Hence, the relationship between 
dyadic tie-substitution and nodal substitution is equivalent to that 
of an observation and the mean from a group of observations. 
For example, an outlier should influence critically the mean 
of observations. For ego with a lower level of nodal substitution, 
a non-substitutable exchange will be present. In contrast, ego 
with a higher level of nodal substitution is likely to enter a highly 
substitutable exchange. Either way, the value of a given exchange 
is weighed against the mean value of all the direct ties, i.e., nodal 
substitution. This means that ego seeks to extract a better terms 
of trade from her partner when the value of a given exchange is 
perceived to be lower than the mean value of her other exchanges. 
Other things being equal, this should be reflected into ego’s more 
share of cooperative outcomes with the partner.   
AN ILLUSTRATION 
In this section, I illustrate one empirical strategy to uncover the 
proposed theoretical mechanism for nodal substitution. Note that 
nodal substitution does not measure social capital available to ego. 
Rather, it measures ego’s subjective evaluation of social capital 
whose presence is not fully known to ego. 
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One way to measure nodal substitution is to employ self-report 
surveys such that the subject is asked to name and assess her 
firm’s direct ties. Apart from measurement errors, an issue yet to 
be solved is to judge whose evaluations are representative of the 
firm under study. As is the case with organizational goal (e.g., Cyert 
and March 1963), consistent and stable evaluations over a firm’s 
social relations are difficult to obtain. This is more likely so when 
the top management team, key decision-makers of the firm, belong 
to multiple, competing coalitions of managers. Alternatively, one 
may consider a variant of Blau’s (1977) heterogeneity index, which 
captures the similarity (or comparability) in the size (or content) 
of cooperative exchanges with a focal firm’s partners. This option 
assumes that the subjective evaluations of a given social relation 
are related to the relative size (or content) of these exchanges. This 
assumption is relatively realistic, yet leaving little from the role of 
perceptions by managers and often demanding detailed information 
concerning exchanges.  
The other way to operationalize nodal substitution is to build on 
the study of repeated ties (Gulati 1995; Cook and Emerson 1978) 
at the ego network level. Although nodal substitution is based on 
the subjective preference over a given tie, only the choice of a given 
tie — which is governed by nodal substitution and arises from a 
bargaining process among coalitions of managers — is observable 
and objective. Hence, one may use this pattern as a proxy for nodal 
substitution. The degree of nodal substitution, λ, for firm i in year t 













where i ≠ j and Z(t)ij = 1 if organizations i and j entered an alliance 
with each other in year t, and R(t)it = Z(t)ij − 1.
λ varies from –1 to 0. Hence, the larger value of this measure 
indicates that ties in ego network are more substitutable. In 
particular, this measure examines the degree of nodal substitution 
at a firm level, not at a dyad level so that λ measures the proportion 
of substitutable ties out of total relationships a firm has. 
With this definition, I estimated the following performance 
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specification to see the effects of nodal-substitution on firm 
profitability. Specifically, I chose the following models: 
∆ROIit =  β0 + β1 × ∆ROIit-1 + β2 × Tie Substitutionit + β3 × Weak 
Componentsit + β4 × Tie Substitutionit × Weak Componetsit 
+ Xβ + e1it,
where X is a matrix of control variables, β are vectors of parameters, 
and eit is the error term.
A change in firm performance at year t, ∆Y(t), is defined as the 
first difference of the dependent variable: ∆Y(t) = Y(t) – Y(t – 1). ROI 
was obtained from yearly net income divided by invested capital 
that is the sum of common equity, long-term debt, and preferred 
stock. I also measured ego’s network structure as the number of 
weak component cliques in ego network. A set of control variables 
included in the analyses were: market capitalization, current ratio, 
and debt ratio of a firm as proxies for operating efficiency and the 
market share of a firm as a proxy for each organization’s market 
power. 
The data used for this illustration were the strategic alliances 
occurring among public firms in the US communication service 
industry from 1991 to 1998. Since the specified model included 
lagged dependent variables, ordinary least square (OLS) estimator 
would be inconsistent if the error term was serially autocorrelated. 
To model empirically firm heterogeneity, I constructed multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity errors by decomposing e it into a homosecastic 
error term, i.e., μt, and an unknown scale function of explanatory 
regressors: eit = σ(Xit)μt. I used an identity function as a sale function 
of explanatory regressors to fit the data. The parameter estimator 
was the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator with the 
correction of heteroscedasticity. It is asymptotically equivalent to the 
maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). Parameters were estimated by 
using PROC MODEL procedure of SAS.
Table a1 gives FGLS estimates for the dynamic process, where 
competition among alliance partners affects the negotiation power of 
a focal organization and accordingly its share of cooperative benefits. 
As shown in the table, firm profitability is negatively correlated with 
Tie Substitution even after controlling for alternative factors. That 
is, an organization loses its negotiation power over its partners as its 
ties become substitutable. 
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study proposes a model of nodal substitution in cooperative 
networks in a bid to examine the division of cooperative outcomes. In 
particular, this study draws on exclusion likelihood to hypothesize 
the effects of nodal substitution on the division of cooperative 
outcomes. Nodal substitution is ego’s subjective evaluation of 
her social relations, which presumes that not all ties are equal in 
quality. Rather than analyzing context-free structural properties of a 
tie such as brokerage and cohesion, this model directly incorporates 
the qualitative difference in ties into the process of cooperative 
exchange among firms. That way, this study seeks to relate the 
effects of tie structure to each actor’s subjective understanding of 
his or her social relations.
Table A1. Tie Substitution and Firm Performancea, b











  0.76 (0.21)**





  0.02 (0.02)
 -0.38 (0.67)





















a) * p<.05; ** p<.01 (one-sided tests). Standard errors in parentheses. b) Pa-
rameters obtained through FGLS with multiplicative heteroscedasticity errors.
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What constitutes the structural effects of social relations is a long-
lasting and arguably inconclusive debate on structuralism (e.g., 
Piaget 1970). Regarding social relations, this debate is rephrased as 
a question of whether the effects of tie structure are distinct from 
those of resources held by each actor involved in social relations. 
Three theoretical stances are available. One is that the effects of tie 
structure — what the structure can do — are a mere reflection of 
what resources flowing through social relations. Giddens (1979) in 
this regard proposes that structure exists as resources (p.64). One 
reason why Giddens (1979) treats resources as structure, more 
precisely, structuring property, is related to his attempt to integrate 
structure into agency, i.e., a model of structuration (see p.69 and 
p.71). Without knowing the type of individually-held resources, one 
cannot uniquely discern the effects of tie structure. For example, 
redundant contacts are otiose only when resources carried by 
redundant contacts are excessive. Indeed, Granovetter (1990) 
complained that a network analysis tended to be biased toward 
reductionism, saying that “it is methodologically more individualist 
than some other sociological traditions (p.95).” Another stance is 
that tie structure fully determine resources flowing through social 
relations. In this case, tie structure manifests itself by shaping 
resources. Cognitive embeddedness (Zuckin and DiMaggio 1990), 
field (Martin 2003) and habitus (Bourdieu 1977) are some examples. 
The other is that the structure and resources of ties are distinct yet 
the former constrains the latter partially. In this case, tie structure 
guides the pattern of social interactions (or exchanges) among 
actors, which in turn affects the accumulation of resources by these 
actors (e.g., Entwise et al. 2007). 
The key difference between the second and third stances lies 
in the ability of structure to generate social practice. The second 
stance regards structure fully responsible for every social practice, 
thus rendering individually-held resources an outcome of structural 
constraints. One weakness of this stance is its unavoidable tendency 
to over-socialize the effects of structure. In contrast, the third 
stance understands structure as the potential for social practice, 
i.e., setting a limit on practices and thus the actual distribution 
of resources among actors. The drawback of this stance is to 
necessitate a theory of agency that materializes the potential for 
practice.  
With nodal substitution, this study seeks to unveil the medium of 
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structural effects along the third theoretical stance of structuralism. 
First, this study views the structure of ties as governing exchanges 
or social interactions among actors. Second, the channeling of 
interactions draws on limitedly rational actors’ perceptions of their 
social relations, which is captured by nodal substitution. Third, as a 
result, the effects of tie structure emerge only after such perceptions, 
often mistaken, emanate decisions and behaviors by actors. That is, 
structure cannot reveal itself independently. 
Against this backdrop, the present study has the following 
theoretical implications. First, a subjective comparability of ties is 
one important way of uncovering the sources of network effects. 
A structuralist account of social action invokes the structure 
and strength of ties as the sources of network effects. Yet, social 
structure is a meaningful constraint on social action to the extent 
that the structure is reproducible, i.e., not transient. This study 
presumes that a reproducible structure is one that is stable. In this 
regard, this study addresses the stability of tie structure by bringing 
in the concept of tie substitution, particularly, nodal substitution 
— a subjective comparability of ties. Second, given the subjective 
comparability of ties, the sources of network effects are not 
separated from the very act of valuing the outcomes of exchanges 
among social actors. That is, valuation — a perception that does 
not necessarily correspond to social structure, which is not fully 
observable — constitutes critically the emergence of social structure, 
i.e., network effects. Without specifying the process of valuation, 
a structuralist account of network effects is likely to yield a black-
box explanation where the outcomes of exchanges occur in a 
certain way and is independent of ego’s intention because structure 
— “unspecified” residuals — dictates that way. Lastly, because 
valuations are not perfect in nature, self-reported social capital may 
not in this regard reflect network effects fully, which means that ego 
and her partners’ valuations should be correlated before generating 
any tangible outcomes in the course of exchanges.  
This study has its own limitations and thus presents additional 
avenues for examining the effects of social relations. First, when 
nodal substitution, a perceived state of social capital, is not 
compatible with the true value of ego’s social capital, does the effects 
of social relations overshadow those of mistaken nodal substitution? 
To address this question, the following analyses should be further 
made: whether nodal substitution by ego leads to actual changes 
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in the structure of ego network. Normally the cost of forming a tie 
reduces the incentive to add a new tie, yet the ineffective transfer of 
resources increases the incentive to add a new one. As equation 1 
shows, the cost of a tie as well as the degree of transfer effectiveness 
shapes ego’s nodal substitution. Such relationships imply that nodal 
substitution should have implication for the addition or deletion of 
ties. It is uncertain however whether increasing nodal substitution 
may readily undermine the ground for tie deletion. It is also likely 
that ego wants to keep highly substitutable ties while preserving her 
negotiation power (e.g. Thompson 1967: 32). For example, a firm 
considering second sourcing partners may keep the exchanges with 
them to be substitutable in a bid to secure its negotiation power 
over suppliers. A further analysis is necessary.
Second, i t  is  a lso important to examine whether the 
correspondence between nodal and structural substitutions varies 
with the structure of ego network. As noted above, structural 
substitution perceived by rational actors should correspond to the 
true structure of ego network. Hence, the correspondence between 
nodal and structural substitutions begs the question of when 
nodal substitution precisely captures the true state of ego network. 
Among possible conditions, network scholars would be interested 
in whether ego assesses her network when the tie structure is full 
or void of brokerage opportunities. If information flows effectively 
through cohesive ties, ego is less likely to err as her network loses 
brokerage opportunities.
Moreover, one important limitation of this study is that it does 
not offer a criterion for judging whether a given share of cooperative 
outcomes is competitively efficient, i.e., fair. While some efforts 
are made in the analysis of network-level effects (see section on 
correlated evaluations and symmetric substitution), a proper 
analysis requests the discourse of moral economy of a kind (e.g., 
Knight 1923). However, any attempt to design social relations will 
solicit the act of placing one network over the other. A normative 
examination of the cooperative outcomes merits surely further 
attention.    
Practically, this model has the following implications. First, 
managers may pay attention to their nodal substitution when 
designing their alliance portfolio. If an alliance portfolio consists 
of mainly less substitutable ties, a firm is expected to enter non-
redundant relationships so as to avoid the possible hold-up problem 
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or to induce bilateral commitments from its partners. Simple 
expansion strategy with multiple alliances will not bring expected 
benefits without carefully planning for tie substitution. Second, 
nodal substitution also suggests a possible governance or control 
devices for alliances. For example, firms with substitutable ties may 
rely on the price mechanism for coordinating exchanges among 
partners, whereas firms with less substitutable ties may develop 
more hierarchy-based control systems for organizing transactions. 
Cooperative exchanges are open to competition among trading 
parties, actual and potential, because interfirm cooperation is a 
way of developing one’s business, and thus an implicit form of 
competition. The way that each party perceives social relations 
may shape the allocation of cooperative outcomes at least in the 
short run. Accordingly, nodal substitution, a form of cognition, may 
facilitate or delay the manifestation of structural constraints by 
social relations.
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